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THE RISE OF SYSTEMATIC PRE-EXECUTION DELAY:
PROPOSING A SOLUTION TO DECADES ON DEATH ROW
Krista MacKay*
Abstract
Although the claim that death row inmates’ pre-execution delays
violate the Eighth Amendment has been historically unsuccessful, the
decision in Jones v. Chappell paved a new path to its success. In Jones,
despite the Ninth Circuit’s disagreement, a federal judge in California
became the first to rule that systematic delay has rendered California’s
death penalty system unconstitutional. The court in Jones defined
systematic delay as delay inherent to the state’s dysfunctional
administration of the death penalty. Due to increasing pre-execution
delays nationwide and recent initiatives to examine and repeal state death
penalty systems, other state courts may soon come to recognize and
declare systematic delay unconstitutional using reasoning similar to the
court in Jones. This would likely require the Supreme Court to finally
address the constitutionality of pre-execution delay. In the meantime, preexecution delay is problematic for inmates on death row—even if not yet
declared unconstitutional—and a solution is necessary to uphold the
purposes of the death penalty. One state attempting to address this
problem is Florida. Florida recently passed the “Timely Justice Act,” the
first legislation of its kind, in an effort to reduce postconviction delays
for death row inmates. Although Florida’s Act has been the subject of
heated controversy, California has since passed a similar proposition
titled the “Death Penalty Reform and Savings Act of 2016.” This Note
examines the limited existing legislation seeking to speed up the
postconviction review process and ultimately proposes more effective
recommendations for legislation to resolve systematic delay.
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INTRODUCTION
Of the 8124 people who received a death sentence between 1977 and
2013, states have only executed seventeen percent.1 The thousands of
prisoners currently on death row spend an average 15.5 years between
sentencing and execution, a number that has steadily increased since the
death penalty was reinstated in 1976.2 In response, death row inmates
have argued that such lengthy execution delays violate the Eighth
1. TRACY L. SNELL, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 2013—STATISTICAL
TABLES 2 (2013), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cp13st.pdf.
2. See id. at 14.
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Amendment’s protection from cruel and unusual punishment.3 Coined
“Lackey claims,”4 such assertions have been historically unsuccessful at
both the state and federal levels.5 In continually denying certiorari to
Lackey claims, the U.S. Supreme Court has indicated that a successful
claim will require some degree of state-caused—systematic—delay.6
In July 2014, the U.S. District Court for the Central District of
California became the first court ever to recognize and declare the
systematic delay of the state’s death penalty unconstitutional under the
Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.7
Jones v. Chappell8 defined systematic delay as excessive and
unpredictable pre-execution delay inherent to the “dysfunctional
administration of California’s death penalty system.”9 The court in Jones
held that such systematic delay results in arbitrary execution; as for the
few inmates who actually realize the possibility of death, their selection
for execution will predominately depend upon the amount of time it takes
them to proceed through California’s “dysfunctional post-conviction
review process.”10 The court further ruled that such inherent delays
deprive the death penalty of its deterrent and retributive purposes.11
As its core authority for showing the state’s systematic delay, the court
in Jones relied upon a comprehensive study of the state’s death penalty
system performed by the California Commission on the Fair
Administration of Justice (Commission).12 The Commission Report
found that delay penetrates every stage of California’s capital
3. E.g., Lackey v. Texas, 514 U.S. 1045, 1045 (1995) (Stevens, J., respecting denial of
certiorari).
4. See Brent E. Newton, Justice Kennedy, the Purposes of Capital Punishment, and the
Future of Lackey Claims, 62 BUFF. L. REV. 979, 999 (2014).
5. See, e.g., People v. Anderson, 22 P.3d 347, 390 (2001) (“[A]ppellate delay in a capital
case is not cruel and unusual punishment.”).
6. See, e.g., Knight, 528 U.S. at 993 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“Where a delay . . . reflects
the State’s own failure to comply with the Constitution’s demands, the claim that the time has
rendered the execution inhuman is a particularly strong one.”); Lackey, 514 U.S. at 1047 (stating
that it “may be appropriate to distinguish . . . among delays resulting from (a) a petitioner’s abuse
of the judicial system . . . ; (b) a petitioner’s legitimate exercise of his right to review; and (c)
negligence or deliberate action by the State”).
7. Jones v. Chappell, 31 F. Supp. 3d 1050, 1053 (C.D. Cal. 2014), rev’d sub nom., Jones
v. Davis, 806 F.3d 538 (9th Cir. 2015). The merits of the case remain influential although the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit stated that it was barred from reviewing the claim because
federal courts may not consider novel constitutional theories on habeas review. Davis, 806 F.3d
at 541.
8. 31 F. Supp. 3d 1050.
9. Id. at 1053.
10. Id. at 1062.
11. Id. at 1063.
12. Id. at 1055–56.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2016

3

Florida Law Review, Vol. 68, Iss. 4 [2016], Art. 5

1166

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 68

postconviction review process.13 In 2008, the state’s elapsed time from
sentencing to execution exceeded two decades,14 a delay much greater
than the national average at that time and today.15 But California’s delay
between sentencing and execution does not make it an extreme outlier
when compared with the Bureau of Justice Statistics’ (Bureau) Report.16
According to the Bureau Report, as of year-end 2013, many states’ preexecution delays exceeded that of California.17
Other states’ death penalty systems have also undergone extensive
review like California, and a handful of states have recently implemented
moratoriums on executions.18 The national rise in pre-execution delay,
the increasing interest in reviewing state death penalty systems, and the
recent trend of death penalty suspensions collectively suggest that other
states may be well on their way to following the court in Jones in
recognizing systematic delays of the death penalty. 19 Systematic delay
could moreover be the means for the Supreme Court to finally address a
Lackey claim.20 Regardless, because pre-execution delay of the death
penalty is not subsiding, it remains clear that a solution must be identified
to ensure the death penalty’s constitutionality.
Florida passed the “Timely Justice Act” in July of 2013, seeking to
speed up the procedural timeline for death row inmates.21 Once an
inmate’s appeals become final, the Act requires the governor to sign a
warrant for execution within thirty days, which is to be carried out no
more than 180 days later.22 The Act additionally addresses areas
13. Id.
14. CAL. COMM’N ON THE FAIR ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS ON THE
ADMINISTRATION OF THE DEATH PENALTY IN CALIFORNIA 6 (2008) [hereinafter COMMISSION
REPORT].
15. In 2008, the national average delay between sentencing and execution was 11.6 years,
and in 2013 it was 15.5 years. See SNELL, supra note 1, at 14 tbl.10.
16. See id. at 18 tbl.15 (listing states with similar average delay times).
17. Id. (showing Texas, Nevada, Georgia, Tennessee, Ohio, Maryland, and North Carolina
as having longer pre-execution delays than California).
18. See, e.g., Illinois Commission on Capital Punishment, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR.,
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/node/674 (last visited Jan. 17, 2017). In 2003, the American Bar
Association began performing its own assessments on several state capital punishment systems,
primarily to determine the extent to which they achieve fairness and due process. AM. BAR ASS’N,
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE FLORIDA DEATH PENALTY REPORT i, http://www.americanbar.org/co
ntent/dam/aba/migrated/moratorium/assessmentproject/florida/executivesummary.authcheckd
am.pdf (last visited Jan. 17, 2017).
19. See Newton, supra note 4, at 999 (“Jones is likely to serve as a catalyst for a renewed
round of Lackey claims, in particular ‘systemic Lackey claims.’”).
20. Id.
21. See S.B. 1750, 2013 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla.) (legislative history of Timely Justice Act of
2013, 2013 Fla. Laws 2596).
22. FLA. STAT. § 922.052(2)(b) (2015).
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including legal representation and reporting requirements.23 As the first
legislation of its kind,24 the Timely Justice Act has been the subject of
great controversy.25 However, since the Act’s passing, California voters
passed similar legislation in the November 2016 election. 26 This Note
analyzes the ability of legislation that speeds up the postconviction
review process to alleviate the systematic delay recently identified in
California’s death penalty system—delay that other states and even the
Supreme Court may soon recognize as highly problematic.
Part I of this Note provides a historical perspective, beginning with a
brief evolution of the death penalty’s standards and then analyzing the
Supreme Court’s treatment of Lackey claims. Part II examines the recent
decision in Jones and explains why other states may also be experiencing
systematic delay. Part III analyzes limited existing state legislation
aiming to speed up postconviction review. Finally, Part IV proposes a
solution to systematic delay, suggesting provisions for effective state
legislation.
I. THE EMERGENCE OF LACKEY CLAIMS
The Eighth Amendment’s cruel and unusual clause has long been
interpreted to prohibit arbitrary application of the death penalty. This Part
provides a brief evolution of the death penalty’s non-arbitrary
requirement and then analyzes the Supreme Court’s treatment of Lackey
claims. Although the court in Jones held that systematic delay violates
the non-arbitrary requirement,27 the Supreme Court has yet to accept
certiorari for a Lackey claim.
A. The Rise of the Non-arbitrary Requirement
The Eighth Amendment prohibits the imposition of cruel and unusual
punishment.28 Although the Constitution does not explicitly define cruel

23. S.B. 1750.
24. Susanna Bagdasarova, Florida Accelerates Death Penalty Process with “Timely Justice
Act,” PROJECT PRESS (Am. Bar Ass’n Death Penalty Representation Project, Washington, D.C.),
Summer 2013, http://www.americanbar.org/publications/project_press/2013/summer/floridaaccelerates-death-penalty-process-with-timely-justice-ac.html.
25. See, e.g., David A. Love, Florida’s Timely Justice Act Is Neither Timely Nor Justice,
HUFFINGTON POST (July 17, 2013, 5:12 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/david-alove/floridas-timely-justice-act-death-penalty_b_3283060.html.
26. Death Penalty Reform and Savings Act of 2016, Cal. Prop. 66, https://www.oag.ca.gov
/system/files/initiatives/pdfs/15-0096%20%28Death%20Penalty%29_0.pdf.
27. See Jones v. Chappell, 31 F. Supp. 3d 1050, 1068 (C.D. Cal. 2014), rev’d sub nom.,
Jones v. Davis, 806 F.3d 538 (9th Cir. 2015).
28. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
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and unusual,29 the Court has long held that this proscription must be
construed according to society’s “evolving standards of decency.”30 In
1972, petitioners in Furman v. Georgia31 argued that such societal
standards had progressed to the point that the death penalty was no longer
constitutional.32 The Court found that the death penalty was being
selectively applied due to a lack of criteria for its imposition, which
violated the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual
punishment.33
Although there was no majority opinion in Furman, the Court
invalidated the petitioners’ death sentences, holding that the death penalty
“could not be imposed under sentencing procedures that created a
substantial risk that it would be inflicted in an arbitrary and capricious
manner.”34 In Furman, Justice William O. Douglas compared the death
penalty’s selective application to the unusualness of getting struck by
lightning.35 As Justice Potter Stewart explained, to “permit this unique
penalty to be so wantonly and so freakishly imposed” would clearly
violate the Eighth Amendment.36 This need for reliability in the
determination of death stemmed from the fact that “death is different,”
unique from all other forms of punishment in its finality.37 The Court
additionally recognized that allowing the death penalty to be arbitrarily
imposed would no longer serve the fundamental penological goals of
deterrence and retribution.38 The decision in Furman effectively
suspended the death penalty, prompting states to enact new statutes that
29. Matthew C. Brewer, Comment, Constitutional Law: Broadening the Criteria for
Defining Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 55 FLA. L. REV. 731, 732 (2003).
30. See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (“The [Eighth] Amendment must draw its
meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.”).
These standards come from “history and traditional usage, legislative enactments, and jury
determinations.” Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 288 (1976) (footnotes omitted).
31. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
32. See id. at 239.
33. Arbitrariness, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR. (July 16, 2015), http://deathpenaltyinfo.org/
arbitrariness. Specifically, the Court was concerned that the death penalty was being unevenly
applied based on prejudices against minorities. See Furman, 408 U.S. at 255 (Douglas, J.,
concurring); id. at 364 (Marshall, J., concurring).
34. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 188 (1976).
35. Furman, 408 U.S. at 309 (Douglas, J., concurring).
36. Id. at 310 (Stewart, J., concurring).
37. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 188 (1973); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280,
305 (1976); see Furman, 408 U.S. at 287 (Brennan, J., concurring).
38. See Furman, 408 U.S. at 311–12 (White, J., concurring) (explaining “a major goal of
the criminal law—to deter others by punishing the convicted criminal—would not be substantially
served where the penalty is so seldom invoked that it ceases to be the credible threat essential to
influence the conduct of others,” and “when imposition of the penalty reaches a certain degree of
infrequency, it would be very doubtful that any existing general need for retribution would be
measurably satisfied”).
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would safeguard against arbitrary sentencing.39 Four years later, in 1976,
the Court in Gregg v. Georgia40 upheld the revised sentencing statutes of
Florida, Georgia, and Texas as non-arbitrary in their application and
therefore constitutional—effectively reinstating the death penalty.41
Although scholars, including current Justices of the Supreme Court,
continue to debate whether the death penalty constitutes cruel and
unusual punishment, the government unquestionably remains responsible
for ensuring that courts do not arbitrarily impose the death penalty and
that it furthers the aims of retribution and deterrence.42
B. A Brief History of the Supreme Court’s Treatment of Lackey
Claims
The claim that pre-execution delay violates the Eighth Amendment’s
cruel and unusual standard was first raised to the U.S. Supreme Court in
the 1995 case of Lackey v. Texas.43 The defense attorney who represented
petitioner Clarence Lackey has explained the claim’s arguments: first, a
prolonged stay on death row was cruel and unusual because it inflicted a
greater punishment than the death penalty; and second, such a lengthy
delay no longer served the purposes of retribution and deterrence—
particularly when the state primarily caused the delay.44 Although the
Court ultimately denied certiorari to Lackey, Justices Stephen G. Breyer
and John P. Stevens agreed that Lackey’s claim was nonetheless
important.45 Respecting denial of certiorari, Justice Stevens explained
that over a century earlier, the Court recognized the uncertainty
experienced by a confined prisoner awaiting execution as “one of the
most horrible feelings,”46 and because that had been in reference to a
four-week pre-execution delay, “that description should apply with even
39. DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., supra note 33.
40. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
41. DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., supra note 33. The revised sentencing statutes provided
objective criteria to limit discretion in the death penalty’s imposition and permitted the court to
consider an individual defendant’s character and record.
42. See Jones v. Chappell, 31 F. Supp. 3d 1050, 1063–64 (C.D. Cal. 2014), rev’d sub nom.,
Jones v. Davis, 806 F.3d 538 (9th Cir. 2015); see also Blake J. Delaney, Comment, A Cruel and
Unusual Application of the Proportionality Principle in Eighth Amendment Analysis, 56 FLA. L.
REV. 459, 460 (2004) (noting that the debate of whether a punishment violates the cruel and
unusual clause of the Eighth Amendment has been ongoing for almost 100 years).
43. 514 U.S. 1045 (1995). In the years following, this argument became known as a “Lackey
claim.” See Newton, supra note 4, at 980.
44. Newton, supra note 4, at 981–84. While the petitioner’s brief for certiorari did not
address retribution or deterrence, the Supreme Court’s denial of certiorari included a brief
discussion of these points. Lackey, 514 U.S. at 1045 (Stevens, J., respecting denial of certiorari).
45. Lackey, 514 U.S. at 1047.
46. Id. at 1045 (quoting In re Medley, 134 U.S. 160, 172 (1890)).
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greater force in the case of delays that last for many years.”47 Justice
Stevens further opined that because such a claim had the “potential for
far-reaching consequences,” lower courts should “serve as laboratories”
to further study its merits before the Supreme Court addresses it.48
Since Lackey, other death row inmates have also asserted that delays
in the postconviction review process rendered their sentences
unconstitutional. In Elledge v. Florida,49 the Supreme Court declined to
address the constitutionality of a Florida inmate’s twenty-three year stay
on death row.50 Respecting denial of certiorari, Justice Breyer argued that
such an extended execution delay was unusual, whether compared to the
death penalty’s practice at that time or to the practices of America and
England when the Constitution was written.51 He additionally referred to
the claim as “serious” because the state’s faulty post-conviction process
was responsible for the delay.52
In Knight v. Florida,53 Justice Breyer again dissented from the denial
of certiorari of another Lackey claim, pressing that the Court should
look to international courts for guidance, as many other countries have
held lengthy pre-execution delays “inhuman, degrading, or unusually
cruel.”54 In opposition, Justice Clarence Thomas, concurring with the
majority in denial of certiorari, stated, “It is incongruous to arm capital
defendants with an arsenal of ‘constitutional’ claims with which they
may delay their executions, and simultaneously [allow them] to
complain when [their] executions are inevitably delayed.” 55 He
additionally argued that the lower courts’ time of experimentation
originally suggested by Justice Stevens in Lackey should be considered
concluded, as courts have repeatedly rejected the claim as meritless.56
Distinguishing this contention, however, Justice Breyer emphasized
that most of the Lackey claims rejected at the lower court level
“involved procedural failings that in part or in whole determined the
outcome of the case,” and only four of the eight Lackey claims heard on
the merits involved delays for which the state was arguably
responsible.57 Thus, he argued it was “hardly evident” that the

47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

Id. at 1046.
Id. (quoting McCray v. New York, 461 U.S. 961, 963 (1983)).
525 U.S. 944 (1998).
Id. at 944 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id.
528 U.S. 990 (1999).
Id. at 995 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Id. at 992 (Thomas, J., concurring).
Id. at 992–93.
Id. at 998 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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experiment should be considered concluded. 58 By pointing out the
limited number of Lackey claims involving delay caused by the state,
Justice Breyer suggested that a successful Lackey claim will require
some degree of systematic delay.
As Lackey claims continued to appear, the gap between death
sentencings and executions continued to increase.59 In the 2009 case of
Thompson v. McNeil,60 Justice Stevens argued that even the then-average
delay of nearly thirteen years underscored “the fundamental inhumanity
and unworkability of the death penalty as it is administered in the United
States,” and surely the Florida petitioner’s stay on death row for thirtytwo years would be “unacceptably cruel.”61 But again, Justice Thomas,
concurring with the denial of certiorari, argued, “It makes ‘a mockery of
our system of justice . . . for a convicted murderer, who, through his own
interminable efforts of delay . . . has secured the almost-indefinite
postponement of his sentence, to then claim that the almost-indefinite
postponement renders his sentence unconstitutional.’”62 Justice Breyer,
however, stressed that a significant amount of the delay in William
Thompson’s case occurred as a result of the state’s defective death penalty
procedures, which were out of the petitioner’s control.63 Thus, the Court’s
debate again centered on whether the pre-execution delay was caused by
the state or self-inflicted. While the Justices have yet to agree on this issue
in any of the Lackey claim cases to reach them, Justice Thomas’s
arguments indicate he would likely agree that some degree of state-caused
delay is necessary for a successful claim.

58. Id. at 999.
59. See, e.g., Valle v. Florida, 132 S. Ct. 1, 1 (2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of
stay) (referring to an over-thirty-three-year stay on death row, Justice Breyer stated, “I have little
doubt about the cruelty of so long a period of incarceration under sentence of death”); Smith v.
Arizona, 552 U.S. 985, 986 (2007) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“I am unaware of other executions
that have taken place after so long a delay [as over thirty years], particularly when much of the
delay at issue seems due to constitutionally defective sentencing proceedings.”); Foster v. Florida,
537 U.S. 990, 992 (2002) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing that a twenty-seven-year confinement
while awaiting execution would be unusual not only in America—where at the time the average
delay was eleven to twelve years—but also in other nations, which held that delays of less than
fifteen years were “degrading, shocking, or cruel”).
60. 556 U.S. 1114 (2009).
61. Id. at 1116 (Stevens, J., respecting denial of certiorari).
62. Id. at 1117 (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting Turner v. Jabe, 58 F.3d 924, 933 (4th Cir.
1995) (Luttig, J., concurring)).
63. Id. at 1120 (Breyer, J., dissenting).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2016

9

Florida Law Review, Vol. 68, Iss. 4 [2016], Art. 5

1172

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 68

Unlike previous denials of certiorari to Lackey claims,64 the 2009 case
of Johnson v. Bredeson65 addressed whether pre-execution delay furthers
the penological purposes of retribution and deterrence. Justice Stevens
issued an opinion respecting denial of certiorari, joined by Justice Breyer,
stating that lengthy pre-execution delay weakens the death penalty’s
justifications.66 In response, Justice Thomas argued that “[s]uch views,
no matter how ‘steadfast[ly]’ held are not grounds for enjoining
petitioner’s execution or for granting certiorari.”67 He explained that
delay is inevitable in providing inmates procedural safeguards, and
although there are alternatives to delay, a system in which execution
immediately follows sentencing would likely be unconstitutional.68
More recently, Justice Anthony Kennedy indirectly weighed in on
pre-execution delay. In the 2014 case of Hall v. Florida,69 the Supreme
Court granted certiorari to determine whether a mentally disabled capital
defendant was eligible for the death penalty.70 Although the case did not
present a Lackey claim, for those familiar with Justice Breyer’s stance on
pre-execution delay, it came as no surprise that during the oral argument
he pointed out that Freddie Hall had spent thirty-five years on death
row.71 However, Justice Kennedy’s comments that followed were not
only off-topic, but unexpected.
JUSTICE KENNEDY: [T]he last ten people Florida has
executed have spent an average of 24.9 years on death row.
Do you think that that is consistent with the purposes of the
death penalty, and . . . is it consistent with sound
administration of the justice system?
MR. WINSOR [counsel for the State of Florida]: Well, I
certainly think it’s consistent with the Constitution, and I
think that there are obvious
JUSTICE KENNEDY: That wasn’t my question.
MR. WINSOR: Oh, I’m sorry, I apologize.
64. See, e.g., id. at 1116 (Stevens, J., respecting denial of certiorari) (noting that “delaying
an execution does not further public purposes of retribution and deterrence but only diminishes
whatever possible benefit society might receive from the petitioner’s death”); Knight v. Florida,
528 U.S. 990, 995 (1999) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“[T]he longer the delay, the weaker the
justification for imposing the death penalty in terms of punishment’s basic retributive or deterrent
purposes.”).
65. 558 U.S. 1067 (2009).
66. Id. at 1069 (Stevens, J., respecting denial of certiorari).
67. Id. at 1072 (Thomas, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
68. Id. at 1072–73.
69. 134 S. Ct. 1986 (2014).
70. See id. at 1991–92.
71. Transcript of Oral Argument at 45, Hall, 134 S. Ct. 1986 (No 12-10882).
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JUSTICE KENNEDY: Is it consistent with . . . the purposes
that the death penalty is designed to serve, and is it consistent
with an orderly administration of justice?
....
MR. WINSOR: It is consistent with the purposes of the death
penalty certainly.
JUSTICE SCALIA: General Winsor, maybe you should ask
us . . . that question, inasmuch . . . as most of the delay has
been because of rules that we have imposed.
JUSTICE KENNEDY: Well, . . . let me . . . ask this. Of
course most of the delay is at the hands of the defendant. In
this case it was 5 years before there was a hearing . . . on the
Atkins question. Has the attorney general of Florida
suggested to the legislature . . . any measures, any
provisions, any statutes, to expedite the consideration of
these cases.
MR. WINSOR: Your Honor, there was a statute enacted last
session, . . . called the Timely Justice Act, that addresses a
number of issues that you raise, and it’s presently being
challenged in front of the Florida Supreme Court.72
Justice Kennedy’s comments are significant because they may
indicate his newfound agreement with the viewpoint of Justice Breyer
and Justice Stevens that the Supreme Court should grant certiorari to
finally address Lackey claims. The fact that Justice Kennedy commented
on the average time spent on death row may additionally suggest his
interest in systematic execution delay73 similar to that recently recognized
as unconstitutional in California.74 Moreover, his concern regarding the
furtherance of penological purposes is notable, as it too lines up with the
reasoning of the decision in Jones.75
II. THE RECOGNITION OF SYSTEMATIC DELAY
This Part examines the recent case of Jones, which declared that the
systematic delay of California’s death penalty system has rendered it
unconstitutional.76 The court in Jones defined systematic delay as delay
inherent to the state’s dysfunctional administration of the death penalty—
72. Id. at 46–47.
73. See Newton, supra note 4, at 998.
74. Jones v. Chappell, 31 F. Supp. 3d 1050, 1069 (C.D. Cal. 2014), rev’d sub nom., Jones
v. Davis, 806 F.3d 538 (9th Cir. 2015).
75. See id. at 1063–65.
76. Id. at 1069.
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affecting every stage of an inmate’s postconviction review process.77 This
Part first provides an overview of California’s systematic delay, focusing
on the Commission’s study which greatly influenced the decision in
Jones. Then, after examining Jones, this Part explains that other states’
death penalty systems are also likely experiencing systematic delay.
A. Examining Jones v. Chappell
In 1992, a twenty-eight-year-old Ernest Jones was arrested and
charged with murder in California.78 He was then sentenced to death three
years later in 1995.79 As of June 2014, Jones had spent twenty-two years
in prison—nineteen of which he spent on death row awaiting final review
of his conviction and sentence.80 Unfortunately, this elapsed time
between sentencing and execution is representative of the death penalty
system in California.81
1. An Overview of California’s Systematic Delay
The court in Jones relied greatly upon the Commission’s
comprehensive study of the California’s death penalty system.82
California established the Commission in 2004, in response to unbiased
study and review in other states which had resulted in considerable
improvements to the criminal justice system.83 The Commission was the
first official body to undertake review of California’s death penalty since
the system was reinstated in 1977.84 The final Commission Report,
released in 2008, found that the state’s death penalty system is
dysfunctional—plagued by backlog and delay at every stage of an
inmate’s postconviction review process.85
A defendant sentenced to death in California, like nearly all other
death penalty states,86 is entitled to three stages of postconviction
77. See id. at 1053.
78. First Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Prisoner in State Custody at
415, Jones, 31 F. Supp. 3d 1050 (No. CV-09-2158-CJC) [hereinafter Petitioner’s Brief].
79. Jones, 31 F. Supp. 3d at 1052–53.
80. See id. Jones was additionally expected to spend several more years in the process of
reviewing his case. See id. at 1053.
81. See id. (“Indeed, for most, systemic delay has made their execution so unlikely that the
death sentence carefully and deliberately imposed by the jury has been quietly transformed into
one no rational jury or legislature could ever impose: life in prison, with the remote possibility of
death.”).
82. See id. at 1055.
83. Charge, CAL. COMM’N ON THE FAIR ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, http://web.archive.org/web/201
60707234556/http://ccfaj.org/?reqp=1&reqr=nzcdYaOjp253YzWyqN==.
84. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 14, at 1.
85. Id. at 3.
86. Gerald F. Uelmen, Death Penalty Appeals and Habeas Proceedings: The California
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review.87 These stages consist of an automatic direct appeal to the
California Supreme Court, a state habeas petition to the California
Supreme Court, and a federal habeas petition to a federal district court.88
A defendant may then appeal decisions by the California Supreme Court
on the direct appeal and state habeas claim to the U.S. Supreme Court by
petition for writ of certiorari.89 Further, a decision by the federal district
court on the federal habeas claim may be appealed to the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit and then to the U.S. Supreme Court.90
Delay for death row inmates in California first sets in while awaiting
appointment of counsel to handle direct appeals to the California
Supreme Court.91 According to the Commission Report, appointment of
counsel for the direct appeal takes an average of three to five years.92
Cases are then scheduled for a hearing before the California Supreme
Court.93 However, the briefing process can take up to four years, followed
by a wait of two to three years until oral arguments are scheduled.94 Most
inmates thus spend a total of twelve to fourteen years litigating their direct
appeals before the California Supreme Court.95 The court in Jones
attributed much of this delay to the state’s underfunding of its death
penalty system, resulting in a “severe shortage of qualified attorneys
available to accept appointment as counsel on direct appeal.”96

Experience, 93 MARQ. L. REV. 495, 498, 501, 502 (2009); Death Penalty Appeals Process,
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN CONTEXT, http://www.capitalpunishmentincontext.org/resources/
dpappealsprocess (last visited Jan. 17, 2017).
87. Id. at 21.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 21–22. This postconviction review process is almost identical in all capital states.
See Post Conviction in Capital Cases, CAP. PUNISHMENT IN CONTEXT,
http://www.capitalpunishmentincontext.org/issues/postconviction (last visited Jan. 17, 2017)
(discussing the appellate and habeas review process in capital states).
91. Jones v. Chappell, 31 F. Supp. 3d 1050, 1056 (C.D. Cal. 2014), rev’d sub nom., Jones
v. Davis, 806 F.3d 538 (9th Cir. 2015). Indigent death row prisoners have a constitutional right to
court-appointed counsel for their initial appeal to the state court. JAMES R. ACKER, QUESTIONING
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 236 (2014). Although this constitutional right does not exist at the later
stages of review, most states provide statutory rights to court appointed counsel in postconviction
proceedings. Id.; see e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1240 (2016).
92. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 14, at 23. Delay in appointment of counsel postpones
certification of the record’s accuracy, which must be completed within 120 days of appointment
as required by California Penal Code Section 190.8(g). Id. at 23 n.28.
93. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 14, at 23.
94. See id. at 44.
95. Id. at 45.
96. Jones, 31 F. Supp. 3d at 1056. For instance, “the Office of the State Public Defender’s
budget has been cut and its staff reduced,” and private appointed counsel are paid at a low rate.
Id.
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Although prompt appointment of habeas counsel would enable the
state habeas petition to be drafted during the direct appeal proceedings
and then swiftly filed upon the direct appeal’s conclusion, the
Commission regrettably found that the average delay in appointing state
habeas counsel is eight to ten years in California.97 This number of
prisoners without state habeas counsel has continually risen in the state.98
As of June 2014, there were 352 prisoners awaiting appointment of state
habeas counsel.99 Delays in appointment of state habeas counsel “can
again be traced to underfunding issues similar to those on direct
appeal.”100 Once counsel is appointed and files the habeas petition, the
Commission reported that there is an additional delay of 1.8 years until
the California Supreme Court issues a decision.101 This delay, however,
has more than doubled since the Commission Report; in 2014, it took
around four years from the filing of the petition until a decision was
issued.102 Overall, an inmate will have spent seventeen years or more by
the time he completes his direct appeal and state habeas review before the
California Supreme Court.103
When the court denies a state habeas petition, an inmate may then file
a habeas petition in federal court.104 The Commission found that the delay
from a habeas petition’s filing to a grant or denial by the federal court
averaged 6.2 years.105 Including a potential appeal to the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit and an appeal therefrom to the U.S.
Supreme Court, the federal habeas review stage in California takes an
average of 10.4 years.106 The court in Jones found that state habeas
proceedings significantly affect federal habeas proceedings.107 For
instance,
if an inmate discovers new facts in the federal proceeding
that were not before the California Supreme Court when it
decided the state habeas petition, that inmate must generally
halt the federal proceeding and return to the California
97. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 14, at 24.
98. Jones, 31 F. Supp. 3d at 1058 (“[A]s of June 2014, 352 inmates—nearly half of Death
Row—were without habeas corpus counsel. And that number is up from 291 inmates awaiting
appointment of habeas counsel in 2008.” (citation omitted)).
99. Id. Comparatively, seventy-one death row prisoners were awaiting counsel for direct
appeal. Id. at 1056.
100. Id. at 1058.
101. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 14, at 24.
102. Jones, 31 F. Supp. 3d at 1059.
103. Id.
104. Id.; 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (2012).
105. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 14, at 57.
106. See id. at 58.
107. Jones, 31 F. Supp. 3d at 1059.
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Supreme Court by way of an exhaustion petition to present
to it the new facts and exhaust the state remedy.”108
The Commission found that “74% of federal habeas applications filed by
California death row inmates are stayed for the exhaustion of state
remedies.”109 Delay for failure to exhaust is also a problem that stems
from the underfunding of state habeas counsel; this underfunding forces
federal habeas counsel “to conduct an investigation at federal government
expense to determine all the facts necessary to support unexhausted
federal constitutional claims and to discover facts necessary to prove
exhausted claims.”110
The Commission found that for those who are denied relief at every
level of postconviction review, the total time spent between the judgment
of death and execution is twenty to twenty-five years.111 Also notable,
California has not carried out an execution since 2006.112 Such prolonged
delay attributable to the state’s dysfunctional administration of the death
penalty system is what the court ultimately considered systematic delay.
After the court sentenced Jones to death in 1995, he waited roughly
four years until he received counsel for his direct appeal.113 He then
waited another four years for the California Supreme Court to affirm his
sentence in March of 2003.114 Altogether, about eight years passed for
Jones from the imposition of his death sentence until the completion of
his automatic appeal.115 Jones received state habeas counsel in October
of 2000, five years after his sentence was imposed and while he was still
litigating his direct appeal.116 The court waited 6.5 years after Jones’s
filing to ultimately deny his state habeas petition.117 Jones filed the
relevant petition for federal habeas review in March of 2010, and he
108. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A) (2012) (requiring petitioner for a writ of habeas corpus to
exhaust all remedies available in state court); see Jones, 31 F. Supp. 3d at 1059 (explaining that
if an inmate discovers new facts that were not in front of the state court when the state court ruled
on the habeas petition, then the inmate must halt federal proceedings and return to state court).
109. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 14, at 58.
110. Judge Arthur L. Alarcón, Remedies for California’s Death Row Deadlock, 80 S. CAL.
L. REV. 697, 748 (2007).
111. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 14, at 25. Although the opinion in Jones says “the
process will likely take 25 years or more,” Jones, 31 F. Supp. 3d at 1054, this is misleading as the
court’s ultimate authority came from the Commission Report. Comparatively, the national
average lapse between sentencing and execution in 2008 was 11.6 years. See SNELL, supra note
1, at 14 tbl.10.
112. Jones, 31 F. Supp. 3d at 1060.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Jones, 31 F. Supp. 3d at 1060.
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amended his claim in April of 2014, asserting that California’s
systematically delayed postconviction review process results in arbitrary
executions and serves no penological purpose.118
2. The Court’s Reasoning
The court explained that as a result of such systematic delay,
California’s death penalty only becomes a reality for a small number of
prisoners.119 As for the few that do realize this reality,
their selection for execution will not depend on whether their
crime was one of passion or of premeditation, on whether
they killed one person or ten, or on any other proxy for the
relative penological value that will be achieved by executing
that inmate over any other . . . . Rather, it will depend upon
a factor largely outside an inmate’s control, and wholly
divorced from the penological purposes the State sought to
achieve by sentencing him to death in the first instance: how
quickly the inmate proceeds through the State’s
dysfunctional post-conviction review process.120
Just as it would be arbitrary to randomly select which members of the
population to sentence to death, the court found that it is arbitrary to
randomly select within a group of death row inmates which ones to carry
out executions against.121
The court additionally held that for the random few that do face
execution, they will have remained on death row for so long that their
execution will no longer serve the purposes of retribution and
deterrence.122 Deterrence, the notion that implementing punishment
discourages crime,123 is dependent upon its certainty and timeliness.124
The execution delay inherent to California’s death penalty system has
blatantly made executions untimely and has additionally made executions
uncertain. With no executions since 2006 and only thirteen total since
118. Id. at 1060–61.
119. See id. at 1062.
120. Id.
121. See id. at 1063 (“Arbitrariness in execution is still arbitrary, regardless of when in the
process the arbitrariness arises.”).
122. Id.
123. STEPHEN STANKO ET AL., LIVING IN PRISON: A HISTORY OF THE CORRECTIONAL SYSTEM
WITH AN INSIDER’S VIEW 56 (2004).
124. Jones, 31 F. Supp. 3d at 1064; United States v. Panico, 308 F.2d 125, 128 (2d Cir. 1962)
(“There can be little doubt that the effectiveness of punishment as a deterrent is related not only
to the quality of the possible punishment but to the certainty and promptness as well.”); STANKO,
supra note 123, at 57 (“Deterrence is dependent upon the severity, speed, and swiftness of the
punishment.”).
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1978, more death row inmates in California have died from natural causes
than from execution.125 Thus, “[a]s the ultimate in-between punishment
between life imprisonment and the death penalty,” a death row inmate
cannot be certain when or if his sentence will ever be carried out.126
Retribution rests on the theory that one deserves to be disciplined for
committing an offense.127 In the context of capital sentencing, retribution
accordingly means that inmates are executed because they deserve it.128
Even dating back to Furman in 1972, the Court recognized that an
infrequent application of the death penalty would cease to serve any
retributive purpose.129 However, due to the excessive delays in
California’s death penalty system, those who have committed the most
heinous crimes for which a death sentence is imposed are for all practical
purposes merely serving out life sentences.130
3. Distinguishing Jones from Prior Unsuccessful Lackey Claims
As the court in Jones stated, courts often reject Lackey claims based
on two justifications: “first, that the delay is reasonably related to the
state’s effort to safeguard the inmate’s constitutional rights by ensuring
the accuracy of its death conviction and sentence, and second, that the
delay is caused by the petitioner himself, and therefore cannot be
constitutionally problematic.”131 The court, however, found that these
bases for denying Lackey claims were not applicable to California’s
administration of the death penalty.132 Although the State in Jones did not
argue that California’s delay is rational or necessary to ensure the
accuracy of inmates’ convictions, the court nonetheless noted that these
arguments would have been unreasonable.133 As evidence, the court cited
to the Commission’s proposed reforms to California’s death penalty
system which would lower the total elapsed time between sentencing and
execution from twenty-five years to the then national average of eleven
to fourteen years.134 The court moreover found that the state itself, not the
125. Jones, 31 F. Supp. 3d at 1062 (“For every one inmate executed by California, seven
have died on Death Row, most from natural causes.”).
126. Angela April Sun, Note, “Killing Time” in the Valley of the Shadow of Death: Why
Systematic Preexecution Delays on Death Row Are Cruel and Unusual, 113 COLUM. L. REV.
1585, 1620 (2013).
127. See STANKO ET AL., supra note 123, at 56.
128. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 304 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring).
129. See id. at 311 (White, J., concurring).
130. See Jones, 31 F. Supp. 3d at 1065.
131. Id.
132. See id. at 1065–66.
133. See id. at 1066.
134. Id. at 7–10, 25–26. Ninth Circuit Judge Arthur Alarcón has similarly stated that delays
are not “inevitable” (as Justice Thomas suggested), so long as California takes action to correct
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inmates, was responsible for the majority of delay in California’s postconviction review process;135 there was no basis to determine that
California’s death row inmates “are simply more dilatory, or have
stronger incentives to needlessly delay the capital appeals process” than
other states’ death row inmates.136 Rejecting popular reasoning for
denying Lackey claims, the court ultimately attributed the delay in Jones’
case to the state’s inherently dysfunctional death penalty system.137
B. Nationwide Systematic Delay
Although the Central District of California is the first to recognize and
declare systematic delay of the death penalty unconstitutional, other
states do not seem far behind. Increasing pre-execution delays, state death
penalty system assessments, and governor-imposed moratoriums suggest
that systematic delay likely exists outside of California.
1. Pre-execution Delays Across America
Delay has not always plagued executions; in colonial and early
American times, authorities typically carried out executions within a
matter of days, weeks, or sometimes months if someone contested the
case.138 However, from 1930 to 1970, the average length of time between
sentencing and execution in the United States rose to 36.7 months.139
Following the death penalty’s reinstatement in 1977, the Bureau began
tracking capital punishment statistics, including the elapsed time from
sentencing to execution.140 Because executions were sparse in the
immediate years following the reinstatement, there are no reliable
averages of execution delays dating that far back.141 However, in 1984,
the first time that there were enough executions to formulate a reliable
number, the Bureau reported that the average elapsed time from
sentencing to execution for all inmates totaled 6.2 years.142 This average
had more than doubled by 2013, increasing to 15.5 years.143 With inmates
lingering on death row for such lengthy periods of time, more inmates
its dysfunctional system. Alarcón, supra note 110, at 711 (quoting Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S.
990, 992 (1999) (Thomas, J., concurring in denial of certiorari)).
135. See id. at 1067.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. JOHN D. BESSLER, CRUEL & UNUSUAL: THE AMERICAN DEATH PENALTY AND THE
FOUNDERS’ EIGHTH AMENDMENT 226 (2012).
139. EVAN J. MANDERY, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN: A BALANCED EXAMINATION
473 (2d. ed. 2012).
140. See SNELL, supra note 1, at 14 tbl.10.
141. See id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
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have died of old age than of executions in states with high death row
populations.144
These execution delays common to present day America vary
amongst states.145 But while the Commission Report found California’s
elapsed time from sentencing to execution exceeded two decades as of
2008,146 the Bureau Report does not reflect that California is an outlier
for execution delay. As of year-end 2013, the Bureau Report reflects that
the average time spent under a sentence of death in California is 16.1
years.147 Comparatively, Tennessee, Kentucky, Nevada, and Idaho
prisoners experience longer execution delays,148 while Georgia, Ohio,
North Carolina, and Florida prisoners experience delays of around fifteen
years.149 States like these, with execution delays exceeding or closely
approaching that of California and the national average, are most
vulnerable to a court finding the delays systematic and potentially
unconstitutional in the wake of Jones.
2. State Death Penalty Assessments
The American Bar Association’s (ABA) assessments of state death
penalty systems also suggest that systematic delay is not isolated to
California. To date, the ABA has conducted assessments and released
reports on the death penalty’s administration in twelve states: Alabama,
Arizona, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Kentucky, Missouri, Ohio,
Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia.150 The assessments
compare each state with over ninety ABA benchmarks on the
constitutional administration of the death penalty. 151 Reports include
detailed sections covering various aspects of states’ death penalty
systems similar to those that the Commission Report outlined in
California.152
144. Newton, supra note 4, at 989.
145. See SNELL, supra note 1, at 18 tbl.15.
146. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 14, at 6. The Report additionally states that “[t]he
average lapse of time between pronouncement of a judgment of death and execution in California
is 17.2 years, but using an ‘average’ number may be misleading since only thirteen have been
executed.” Id. at 22.
147. SNELL, supra note 1, at 18 tbl.15.
148. Id. Inmates in these states respectively spend an average of 18.4 years, 18.3 years, 17.7
years, and 16.2 years on death row. Id.
149. Id. Inmates in these states respectively spend an average of 15.5 years, 15.4 years, 15.2
years, 15.1 years, and 15 years on death row. Id.
150. State Death Penalty Assessments, AM. BAR ASS’N, http://www.americanbar.org/groups/
crsj/projects/death_penalty_due_process_review_project/state_death_penalty_assessments.html
(last visited Jan. 17, 2017).
151. Id.
152. Id.
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With respect to legal defense, the state assessments found that most
states do not have “the kind of legal services system that is necessary to
ensure that defendants charged with capital offenses or on death row
receive the defense they require.”153 In fact, “[f]ew states meet the
standards set out by the ABA Guidelines on the Appointment and
Performance of Defense Counsel in Death Penalty Cases (2003)” (ABA
Guidelines).154 The state assessments identified that most examined states
“lack rigorous qualification standards for and monitoring of counsel
appointed to capital cases.” Because the ABA Guidelines “embody the
current consensus about what is required to provide effective defense
representation in capital cases,”155 it follows that these shortcomings
likely result in less than effective representation, which the Commission
Report found contributes systematic delay.156 The state assessments also
identified inadequate compensation of counsel in the majority of
examined states much like in California.157 Several state assessments even
resulted in the ABA recommending moratoriums on executions until states
adequately comply with the assessments’ recommendations.158 The state
assessments collectively demonstrate that other states are facing many of
the same problems responsible for delay in California’s death penalty
system. It is therefore possible that states such as these will soon
recognize systematic delay in their own death penalty systems.

153. AM. BAR ASS’N, THE STATE OF THE MODERN DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA 7 (2013),
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/death_penalty_moratorium/aba_sta
te_of_modern_death_penalty_web_file.authcheckdam.pdf.
154. Id. at 7.
155. AM. BAR ASS’N, GUIDELINES FOR THE APPOINTMENT AND PERFORMANCE OF DEFENSE
COUNSEL IN DEATH PENALTY CASES 920 (2003), http://www.americanbar.org/content/
dam/aba/migrated/2011_build/death_penalty_representation/2003guidelines.authcheckdam.pdf.
156. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 14, at 57–58.
157. See State Death Penalty Assessments, supra note 150.
158. Id. The ABA recommended moratoriums in Alabama, Georgia, Indiana, and Tennessee.
AM. BAR ASS’N, EVALUATING FAIRNESS AND ACCURACY IN STATE DEATH PENALTY SYSTEMS: THE
ALABAMA DEATH PENALTY ASSESSMENT REPORT iv (2006), http://www.americanbar.org/content/
dam/aba/migrated/moratorium/assessmentproject/alabama/report.authcheckdam.pdf; AM. BAR
ASS’N, EVALUATING FAIRNESS AND ACCURACY IN STATE DEATH PENALTY SYSTEMS: THE GEORGIA
DEATH PENALTY ASSESSMENT REPORT v (2006), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migr
ated/moratorium/assessmentproject/georgia/report.authcheckdam.pdf; AM. BAR ASS’N, EVALUATING
FAIRNESS AND ACCURACY IN STATE DEATH PENALTY SYSTEMS: THE INDIANA DEATH PENALTY
ASSESSMENT REPORT viii (2007), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/moratorium/
assessmentproject/indiana/report.authcheckdam.pdf; AM. BAR ASS’N, EVALUATING FAIRNESS AND
ACCURACY IN STATE DEATH PENALTY SYSTEMS: THE TENNESSEE DEATH PENALTY ASSESSMENT
REPORT ix (2007), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/moratorium/assessmentp
roject/tennessee/finalreport.authcheckdam.pdf.
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3. Death Penalty Repeals and Moratoriums
Nineteen states and the District of Columbia to date have abolished
the death penalty.159 Meanwhile, Colorado, Oregon, Pennsylvania, and
Washington are currently under governor-imposed moratoriums—all
four states acknowledging delay of the death penalty system as a
motivating factor.160 Explaining his 2015 decision, Pennsylvania
Governor Tom Wolf stated that the “the only certainty in the current
system is that the process will be drawn out, expensive, and painful for
all involved.”161 Washington Governor Jay Inslee similarly commented
in support of his 2014 decision that Washington’s “death sentences are
neither swift nor certain.”162 Likewise, then-Oregon Governor John
Kitzhaber expressed concerns over pre-execution delay, stating in 2011,
“The reality is that Oregon’s death row is an extremely expensive life
prison term.”163
A combination of state execution delays that continue to exceed those
in California and the national average, a public push for state death
penalty review, and gubernatorial moratoriums on executions are all good
indications that the system is in a state of flux. Other states may
accordingly soon recognize and declare systematic delays
unconstitutional using reasoning similar to the court in Jones, which
would likely require the Supreme Court to finally address pre-execution
delay.

159. States with and Without the Death Penalty, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR.,
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/states-and-without-death-penalty (last visited Jan. 17, 2017).
Alaska, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts,
Michigan, Minnesota, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Dakota, Rhode Island,
Vermont, West Virginia, and Wisconsin have abolished the death penalty. Id.
160. See Statements from Governors of Pennsylvania, Washington, Colorado, and Oregon
Halting Executions, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/node/5792
(last visited Jan. 17, 2017); see also, e.g., Colo. Exec. Order No. D 2013-006 (May 22, 2013),
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/documents/COexecutiveorder.pdf (“If the State of Colorado is
going to undertake the responsibility of executing a human being, the system must operate
flawlessly. Colorado’s system for capital punishment is not flawless.”).
161. Peter Hall, Pennsylvania Gov. Tom Wolf Halts Death Penalty, MORNING CALL (Feb.
13, 2015, 7:58 PM), http://www.mcall.com/news/breaking/mc-pa-death-penalty-moratoriumtom-wolf-20150213-story.html (quoting Pennsylvania Governor Tom Wolf).
162. Governor Jay Inslee, Governor Inslee’s Remarks Announcing a Capital Punishment
Moratorium (Feb. 11, 2014), http://www.governor.wa.gov/sites/default/files/documents/
20140211_death_penalty_moratorium.pdf.
163. Press Release, Oregon Governor’s Office, Gov. Kitzhaber Issues Reprieve—Calls for
Action on Capital Punishment (Nov. 22, 2011), http://www.oregon.gov/newsroom/
Pages/NewsDetail.aspx?newsid=589.
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III. LEGISLATION MINIMIZING SYSTEMATIC DELAY
Some states have or are in the process of enacting legislation in efforts
to reduce delays in the postconviction review process. This Part examines
whether such legislation may provide a solution to the systematic delay
recently recognized in California—delay that other states and the
Supreme Court may soon identify.
A. Florida’s “Timely Justice Act”
In June 2013, Florida passed the “Timely Justice Act” with the
legislative intent to resolve all postconviction actions as quickly as
possible.164 To accomplish this objective, the Act addresses areas
including legal representation, reporting requirements, and—most
controversially—death warrants.165 As the first legislation of its kind,166
the Timely Justice Act has sparked great debate. While its supporters
contend it will minimize pre-execution delay, opponents argue that it will
“exacerbate existing problems in a system already plagued by errors and
a lack of funding and resources.”167
1. Key Provisions of the Timely Justice Act
With respect to legal representation, the Act seeks to protect inmates
by prohibiting attorneys from representing a capital defendant for five
years if, on two separate occasions, an attorney provided “constitutionally
deficient representation” in capital postconviction proceedings for which
relief was granted.168 This encourages competent lawyering that could
reduce delays caused by ineffective assistance of counsel—delay which
contributes to California’s systematic delay. Still, the potential reduction
in the number of available attorneys could simultaneously create delay of
its own. Moreover, even assuming available qualified attorneys remain,
the Act requires the court to grant relief for deficient representation in
order for attorney suspension to take effect, and surely a large amount of
deficient representation is not granted relief, goes unnoticed, or perhaps
is not realized until years later.
The Act additionally reopens a Capital Collateral Regional Counsel
(CCRC) office in the northern part of Florida.169 CCRC exclusively
164. See S.B. 1750, 2013 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla.) (legislative history of Timely Justice Act of
2013, 2013 Fla. Laws 2596).
165. Id.
166. Bagdasarova, supra note 24.
167. Id.
168. State of Fla. Appropriations Committee, Bill Analysis and Fiscal Impact Statement,
S.B. 1750, at 2 (Apr. 22, 2013), https://www.flsenate.gov/Session/Bill/2013/1750/Analyses/
2013s1750.ap.PDF.
169. Id.
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handles postconviction review and receives compensation from the
state.170 Florida’s northern CCRC office was terminated in 2003, in favor
of a pilot program of private appointed attorneys meeting minimum
capital experience requirements.171 Unfortunately, the pilot program was
widely criticized for providing poor lawyering.172 Reopening the northern
CCRC office will accordingly provide capital defendants with more
effective counsel, which will in turn reduce delays in postconviction
review. This provision of the Act better addresses delay caused by
ineffective assistance of counsel than does placing attorneys who have
provided deficient representation on probation because it prevents the
delay at its root cause. The availability of effective state counsel would
additionally help to solve delays in appointment of counsel—another area
of California’s systematic delay.
The Act fails, however, to provide a remedy for the many death row
inmates that may have received ineffective assistance of counsel during
the pilot program’s existence.173 The ABA contends that “many of the
prisoners whose appeals were exhausted under the pilot program may
now be subject to expedited execution procedures without appointment
of new counsel.”174 As for prisoners who have not yet exhausted their
appeals, the Act permits attorneys previously appointed through the pilot
program to continue representing death row inmates in their appeals.175
The Act also increases the amount of capital defendants that those
attorneys may represent at one time from five to ten.176 This could cause
delays at the federal habeas stage if attorneys from the pilot program
provided or continue to provide poor lawyering resulting in the failure to
exhaust available state remedies. Considering that these attorneys may
now double their caseloads of capital defendants, the risk of delay for
failure to exhaust might become even greater. Although the faults of the
pilot program are specific to Florida, they reinforce the importance of
competent habeas counsel in reducing systematic delay as recognized in
California.
In addition to addressing legal representation, the Act aims to remedy
delay through the imposition of reporting requirements on courts. For
170. See Gary Blankenship, Capital Cases Pilot Program Reviewed, FLA. BAR NEWS (Oct.
15, 2003), http://www.floridabar.org/DIVCOM/JN/JNnews01.nsf/Articles/A9527C3261C90D2
085256DBB007378D9.
171. Bagdasarova, supra note 24.
172. Id. (“Florida Supreme Court Justice Raoul Cantero . . . described the work of the
appointed lawyers as ‘[s]ome of the worst lawyering’ he had ever seen.”).
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. See id.
176. S.B. 1750, 2013 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla) (legislative history of Timely Justice Act of 2013,
2013 Fla. Laws 2596).
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instance, the Act requires the “Florida Supreme Court [to] annually report
to the [Legislature] the status of each capital case in which a
postconviction action has been filed that has been continuously pending
for more than [three] years.”177 While this provision enables the state to
monitor delays, a more effective provision would set out a plan for
remedying them.
Most controversially, the Timely Justice Act seeks to expedite the
death penalty process by requiring the governor to sign an execution
warrant within thirty days of the clemency process’ conclusion and to
schedule an execution within 180 days therefrom.178 Although the Act’s
execution warrant timeline does protect against delay, neither California
nor previous Lackey claims have recognized delay after the conclusion of
clemency. The court in Jones nonetheless considered the total elapsed
time between sentencing and execution in defining systematic delay,
suggesting that systematic delay includes delay after the conclusion of
postconviction review.179 Even so, this provision of the Act would only
minimally contribute to resolving California’s systematic delay because
its biggest delays occur during the automatic appeal, the state habeas
petition, and the federal habeas petition.180
2. Responses to the Act and its Ability to Alleviate
Systematic Delay
Although the Timely Justice Act offers meaningful insight as to how
systematic delay might be reduced, it has not been widely championed,
particularly in light of the ABA’s state assessment of Florida’s death
penalty system. The ABA in 2006 found that multiple areas of Florida’s
death penalty system “fall[] short in the effort to afford every capital
defendant fair and accurate procedures” including insufficient
compensation for postconviction review counsel and lack of qualified and
properly monitored postconviction review counsel.181 These systematic
problems, the ABA reported, contribute to Florida having the highest
exoneration rate in the country. 182

177. Id.
178. FLA. STAT. § 922.052(2)(a) (2015).
179. Jones v. Chappell, 31 F. Supp. 3d 1050, 1056–59 (C.D. Cal. 2014), rev’d sub nom.,
Jones v. Davis, 806 F.3d 538 (9th Cir. 2015).
180. Id.
181. AM. BAR ASS’N, EVALUATING FAIRNESS AND ACCURACY IN STATE DEATH PENALTY
SYSTEMS: THE FLORIDA DEATH PENALTY ASSESSMENT REPORT iii (2006),
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/moratorium/assessmentproject/florida/re
port.authcheckdam.pdf.
182. Bagdasarova, supra note 24.
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Upon proposal of the Timely Justice Act, the ABA therefore
expressed concern that by accelerating postconviction review, the
opportunity for wrongful conviction would be increased.183 President
Laurel Bellows of the ABA even wrote to Florida’s Governor Rick Scott
urging him to veto the Act.184 She wrote, “Florida’s existing system
cannot ensure fairness or accuracy, which must be the hallmarks of any
case in which the death penalty is sought. The legislation before you does
little to correct or prevent miscarriages of justice in cases where a
person’s life is at stake . . . .”185
Death row inmates have similarly questioned the Act’s efforts to
speed up postconviction review. Less than a month after Florida passed
the Act, over 100 death row inmates filed a challenge to the Florida
Supreme Court, arguing that “[c]onstitutional protections must not be lost
to expediency.”186 Petitioners alleged, amongst other claims, that the
Act’s time requirements for issuing death warrants prevent inmates from
pursuing other capital proceedings, such as successive postconviction
litigation, and infringe upon the court’s authority to regulate practice and
procedure.187 The Florida Supreme Court, however, upheld the Act as
constitutional.188
In considering the impact that Florida’s Timely Justice Act could have
on California’s death penalty system, it must be noted that, unlike
California, studies of Florida’s death penalty system have not yet focused
on its delays or their causes. Nonetheless, while the Commission Report
found that capital defendants in California who are denied relief at every
level of postconviction review spend between twenty and twenty-five
years on death row, the Bureau’s reports track California and Florida’s
pre-execution delays on a much closer scale. According to the Bureau’s
most recent report, California inmates spend an average of 16.1 years
between sentencing and execution while Florida inmates experience
average pre-execution delays of 15.0 years.189 That Florida is
experiencing delays on a similar scale to California and has passed an Act
seeking to reduce delays therefore suggests that Florida too may be
experiencing systematic delay. Accordingly, although the Timely Justice
Act was not written with an eye to California’s systematic delay, it offers
insight as to how systematic delay might best be addressed.
183. See id.
184. Letter from Laurel G. Bellows, President, Am. Bar Ass’n, to Rick Scott, Fla. Governor
(May 15, 2013), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/uncategorized/GAO/2013may16_
timelyjustice_l.authcheckdam.pdf.
185. Id.
186. Bagdasarova, supra note 24.
187. E.g., Abdool v. Bondi, 141 So. 3d 529, 538 (Fla. 2014).
188. Id. at 540.
189. SNELL, supra note 1, at 18 tbl.15.
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Even though the Act has received criticism for speeding up
postconviction review, it is significant that the Act addresses problems
that the ABA’s state assessment of Florida’s death penalty system
identified. The Act makes efforts to ensure qualified and properly
monitored postconviction review counsel in light of Florida’s leading
exoneration rate. These provisions would be beneficial to California as
well as other states in reducing, or at the very least, preventing delays in
postconviction review. However, the Act fails to offer a solution to the
ABA’s finding that postconviction review counsel in Florida are
insufficiently compensated. This is troublesome considering that
California found inadequate compensation of counsel contributes to
various delays throughout postconviction review.190 In California,
inadequate compensation of counsel initially creates delays in
appointment of counsel at the automatic appeal and state habeas review,
which in turn causes delays in the filing of briefs and the issuance of
decisions.191 California also found that insufficient compensation in hand
with underfunding of counsel contribute to delays at the federal level of
review when claims are stayed for failure to exhaust available state
remedies.192 These delays in California suggest that it was an oversight
for the Timely Justice Act to ignore the ABA’s finding that Florida
insufficiently compensates postconviction review counsel. Similar to the
universal applicability of the Act’s provisions regarding competent
counsel, adequate compensation and funding of counsel would help to
alleviate postconviction delays in California and at least contribute to
preventing, if not reducing, delays nationwide.
Altogether, the Act’s efforts to provide competent postconviction
counsel have the potential to reduce systematic delay. Still, the Act fails
to address Florida’s inadequate compensation of counsel—California’s
seemingly biggest source of delay. Although remedying this problem
would likely reduce delays further down the chain of postconviction
review, the Act could additionally propose timelines for the appointment
of counsel, filing of briefs, and issuance of decisions.
B. California’s Death Penalty Reform and Savings Act of 2016
In the November 8, 2016 election, California voters passed the
Death Penalty Reform and Savings Act of 2016, presented on the
California ballot as Proposition 66. The Proposition seeks to eradicate
wastes, delays, and inefficiencies in California’s death penalty system
through amendments and additions to California’s Penal and
190. See Alarcón, supra note 110, at 717–21.
191. Id.
192. Id.
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Government Codes.193 Although the Proposition contains provisions
sure to reduce delays, it also presents new issues. Proponents filed a suit
on November 9, 2016 to block the Proposition from taking effect.194
1. State Habeas Corpus Petitions
The Proposition first proposes to shorten delays at the state habeas
level by granting initial jurisdiction over state habeas corpus proceedings
to the trial courts. Petitioners will be required to file their original
petitions for writ of habeas corpus in the trial court where the judgment
of death was entered, unless good cause exists for the petition to be heard
in another court.195 In ruling on a petition, the trial court must “issue a
statement of decision explaining the factual and legal basis for its
decision[].”196 Within thirty days, petitioners may then appeal the trial
court’s findings to the district courts of appeal, who will be “required to
file an opinion on the rulings of the trial court before the Supreme Court
reviews the case.”197 If the California Supreme Court disagrees with the
appellate court, it may reverse the appellate court’s decision and “send
the matter back for modification or for return to the trial court for further
hearings on any or all of the habeas corpus claims raised in the
petition.”198 Altogether, the Proposition’s requirement that petitioners file
their initial habeas corpus petitions in the trial courts adds two additional
layers of review to California’s death penalty system.199
This shift in initial habeas corpus jurisdiction is unquestionably an
effort to alleviate the California Supreme Court’s backlog. Yet opponents
point out that California counties do not proportionately issue death
sentences.200 In the past ten years, California has sentenced 188 people to
death, 136 of which were sentenced in just five counties.201 Opponents of
the Proposition accordingly fear that it will create unmanageable
workloads for trial and appellate courts, in addition to creating
193. Death Penalty Reform and Savings Act of 2016, Cal. Prop. 66, https://www.oag.ca.gov/
system/files/initiatives/pdfs/15-0096%20%28Death%20Penalty%29_0.pdf.
194. Former California Officials File Taxpayer’s Suit Against Proposition 66, DEATH
PENALTY INFO. CTR., http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/node/6602 (last visited Jan. 17, 2017).
195. Death Penalty Reform and Savings Act § 6.
196. Id.
197. Alarcón Advocacy Center, California Votes 2016: An Analysis of the Competing Death
Penalty Ballot Initiatives 55 (July 20, 2016), http://www.lls.edu/media/loyolalawschool/newsroo
m/newsitems/FINAL%20Alarcon%20Advocacy%20Center%20Report%20Competing%20DP%
20Initiatives.pdf.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Bureaucratic Nightmare, NO ON 66, https://nooncaprop66.org/bureaucratic-nightmare/
(last visited Jan. 17, 2017).
201. Id.
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complications for the California Supreme Court in reviewing decisions
of lower court judges who do not have experience handling capital habeas
petitions.202 These fears, however, seem unwarranted. Although state
habeas petitions would initially burden trial and appellate courts
disproportionately in light of the backlog of habeas corpus petitioners
awaiting review, this effect would lessen as the backlog is reduced. The
Proposition additionally caveats that a petition for writ of habeas corpus
should be heard by the trial court which imposed the sentence, unless
good cause is shown for the petition to be heard by another court. If good
cause is interpreted to include the consideration of judicial resources,
caseloads will remain manageable. Moreover, “[t]rial court judges are
uniquely qualified to hear original habeas corpus claims because they are
already familiar with the evidence presented at trial.”203
The Proposition’s requirement that trial and appellate court judges
hearing the petition issue written orders explaining their decisions will
also help in relieving delays. As the law in California stands, the
California Supreme Court is not required to issue an order detailing its
decision, which “places the burden on federal district courts to determine
whether the death row inmate’s federal constitutional claims have
merit.”204 Still, the Proposition could go further in reducing delays by
“permit[ting] the [California] Supreme Court to exercise its discretion
whether to review the opinion of a California Court of Appeal in
affirming or denying a [trial] court’s judgment in a state habeas corpus
proceeding.”205 This would eliminate an unnecessary step in the review
process when the California Supreme Court has no reason to believe that
a capital petitioner’s claims have merit.
2. Appointment of Counsel
In addition to the Proposition’s proposed legal structure for reviewing
state habeas corpus petitions, it newly requires trial courts to take on the
responsibility of appointing counsel to prisoners after a death sentence is
imposed.206 Trial courts, inherently aware of when a death sentence has
been imposed, are arguably in the best position to reduce the over eight
year delay that exists between sentencing and the California Supreme
Court’s appointment of habeas counsel.207 However, this provision of the
Proposition ignores the Commission Report’s finding that delays in
appointment of counsel are largely due to the underfunding and
202. Id.
203. Alarcón, supra note 110, at 743.
204. Id. at 744.
205. Id.
206. Death Penalty Reform and Savings Act of 2016 § 6, Cal. Prop. 66, https://www.oag.ca.
gov/system/files/initiatives/pdfs/15-0096%20%28Death%20Penalty%29_0.pdf.
207. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 14, at 24.
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inadequate compensation of counsel.208
The Proposition’s provisions regarding appointment of counsel at the
direct appeal are even more concerning. The Proposition provides that
[w]hen necessary to remove a substantial backlog in
appointment of counsel for capital cases, the [California]
Supreme Court shall require attorneys who are qualified for
appointment to the most serious non-capital appeals and who
meet the qualifications for capital appeals to accept
appointment in capital cases as a condition for remaining on
the court’s appointment list.209
This aims to reduce the current delays of three to five years in the
appointment of counsel to handle the direct appeal. But much like delays
in appointment of state habeas counsel, delays in the appointment of
counsel to handle the direct appeal are attributable to inadequate
compensation.210
Although placing the burden on trial courts to appoint state habeas
counsel is a helpful, albeit small, step in reducing delays, requiring
appellate attorneys to accept appointments to remain on the appointment
list may “open a floodgate of new ineffective assistance of counsel cases
due to an increased number of incompetent, unqualified, [and]
improperly trained lawyers taking death penalty cases.”211 It is also
questionable whether forced appointments would even aid in reducing
delays considering that a survey of appellate attorneys found that 73%
would rather retire or leave the appointment list than be forced to take on
capital cases.212 Moreover, requiring trial courts to appoint state habeas
counsel and permitting the California Supreme Court to require appellate
counsel to accept appointments both overlook the role that inadequate
compensation plays in the availability of attorneys willing to accept
appointment.
208. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 14, at 52–54; Alarcón Advocacy Center, supra
note 197, at 56 (The Proposition “allocates no additional funding to these courts to carry out this
enormous task, nor does it indicate where or how the superior courts are supposed to locate
qualified habeas counsel to take on these cases, which is concerning given that the California
Supreme Court, and other state entities dedicated to carrying out that task, have been unsuccessful
in finding qualified, available counsel.”).
209. Death Penalty Reform and Savings Act § 5.
210. Commission Report, supra note 14, at 47 (“For the level of experience required and the
rigorous demand of death appeals, the low level of income is certainly a significant factor in the
decline of the pool of attorneys available to handle death penalty appeals.”).
211. Proposition 66, The “Death Penalty Reform and Savings Act of 2016,” is Fool’s Gold
for Californians, THE MODERATE VOICE, http://themoderatevoice.com/217736/ (last visited Jan.
17, 2017).
212. Alarcón Advocacy Center, supra note 197, at 52–56.
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Addressing inadequate compensation would more effectively reduce
delays in appointment of counsel as well as the myriad of delays resulting
therefrom. The Commission Report proposed that “[t]he most direct and
efficient way to reduce the backlog of death row inmates awaiting
appointment of appellate counsel would be to . . . expand the Office of
the State Public Defender.”213 “[T]o the extent appointments of private
counsel are utilized,” the Commission Report recommended that they “be
fully compensated at rates that are commensurate with the provision of
high quality legal representation and reflect the extraordinary
responsibilities in death penalty representation.”214 To address delays in
appointment of state habeas counsel, the Commission Report similarly
suggested that California expand its habeas corpus resource center and
ensure that appointed counsel are sufficiently compensated.215
3. The Filing and Deciding of State Habeas Petitions
With respect to timeframes, the Proposition requires that state habeas
counsel file the initial habeas petition within one year of appointment,
unless limited exceptions apply.216 Attorneys were previously given three
years from the date of their appointment to file the habeas petition.217
Although limiting the filing time to one year will reduce delays, it may
force attorneys to spend less of their already limited time and resources
in preparing the initial petition. Because the failure to fully investigate a
petitioner’s claims at the state habeas level significantly influences delays
at the federal habeas level, the one-year filing timeline may very well
contribute to delays instead of remedying them. Providing adequate
compensation and funding to state habeas counsel would be a more
effective way for the Proposition to reduce delays in the filing of state
habeas claims. Adequate compensation would lead to the availability of
more state habeas counsel which would in turn reduce delays in filing
because counsel would have more time to dedicate to each petition.
Increasing funding to counsel would at the same time assure that claims
are fully investigated at the state habeas level, thus reducing delays in
federal habeas review.218
Once the initial habeas petition is filed, the Proposition requires that
the trial court resolve it within one year, unless “delay is necessary to
213. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 14, at 47.
214. Id. at 49.
215. Id. at 55.
216. Death Penalty Reform and Savings Act of 2016 § 6, Cal. Prop. 66, https://www.oag.ca.
gov/system/files/initiatives/pdfs/15-0096%20%28Death%20Penalty%29_0.pdf; see CAL. GOV’T
CODE § 68662 (West 2016).
217. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 14, at 51.
218. Id. at 53.
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resolve a substantial claim of actual innocence, but in no instance shall
the court take longer than two years to resolve the petition.”219 Because
the current delay between the filing of a state habeas petition and the
California Supreme Court ruling on it is only 22 months, this provision
would at best only minimally reduce delay. Opponents of the Proposition
argue that assuming habeas corpus petitions are distributed in accordance
with the counties issuing death sentences, capital caseloads may demand
over 100% of a trial court’s judicial resources, displacing, rather than
remedying delay.220 However, the burden on judicial resources would
lessen as the backlog of habeas petitions is reduced, or could be avoided
altogether if “good cause” is interpreted to consider judicial resources.
The Proposition further requires that the Judicial Counsel “adopt
initial rules and standards of administration designed to expedite the
processing of capital appeals and state habeas corpus review” so that state
courts may complete the automatic appeal and initial state habeas review
“[w]ithin five years of the adoption of the initial rules or the entry of
judgment, whichever is later.”221 This would be a drastic reduction from
the average delay of twelve years that the Commission Report found to
exist between the imposition of a death sentence and the issuance of the
California Supreme Court’s decision on the habeas petition.222 The
Alarcón Advocacy Center has opined, however, that
[d]eciding all capital appeals and state post-conviction
petitions within five years is not only not feasible or
advisable—it is not possible. The California Supreme Court
is required under the California Constitution to hear all
direct appeals in capital cases, but it cannot keep up with the
pace of new death sentences. The Court currently has a
backlog of over 150 fully briefed capital appeals and habeas
petitions that are awaiting oral argument and final
disposition. Hundreds more are in the pipeline, many where
counsel has yet to be appointed, and a steady stream of new
cases behind those with no end in sight.223
One proposed solution to the California Supreme Court’s backlog that
could allow for initial state habeas petitions to be decided more quickly
is giving California Courts of Appeal jurisdiction to review automatic
appeals from death penalty judgments.224 Under this proposal, the
219. Death Penalty Reform and Savings Act § 6.
220. Alarcón Advocacy Center, supra note 197, at 57 “[I]n Riverside County, the capital
habeas caseload would demand 107% of the county’s current superior court judicial resources.”).
221. Death Penalty Reform and Savings Act § 3.
222. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 14, at 25.
223. Alarcón Advocacy Center, supra note 197, at 58.
224. Alarcón, supra note 110, at 727.
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California Supreme Court should be given the discretion to grant or deny
a motion for review of a Court of Appeal’s decision in an automatic
appeal.225 This revised review of automatic appeals would result in a vast
reduction of the back log of cases currently awaiting the California
Supreme Court’s review.
4. Responses to California’s Death Penalty Reform and Savings
Act of 2016
The day after the Proposition was passed, opponents filed a suit to
enjoin it from taking effect, arguing that its deadlines would set “an
inordinately short timeline for the courts to review those complex cases
and result in attorneys cutting corners in their investigations.”226 Though
its constitutionality thus remains unclear, the Proposition’s proposed
review cycle for state habeas claims could prove instrumental in reducing
California’s delays. The Proposition’s provisions regarding appointment
of counsel and the filing and deciding of state habeas petitions, however,
fail to address that the underlying cause of California’s delays in
appointment of counsel is inadequate compensation. The Proposition also
fails to provide meaningful reductions in delays at the automatic appeal,
rendering the Proposition incapable of drastically reducing the California
Supreme Court’s backlog.
IV. PROPOSING A SOLUTION TO SYSTEMATIC DELAY
Pre-execution delay is problematic for inmates on death row—even
if not yet declared unconstitutional—and a solution is necessary to uphold
the purposes of the death penalty. Therefore, this Note proposes
recommendations for legislation to reduce and prevent pre-execution
delay occurring at the automatic appeal and state habeas level of review
and analyzes why the recommendations are more effective and
comprehensive than existing legislation.
Every state should establish comprehensive legislation to reduce and
prevent pre-execution delay occurring at the direct appeal and state
habeas level of review. In doing so, the importance of states conducting
in depth assessments of their own death penalty systems cannot be
understated; states must ensure that their legislation addresses any delays
and problems unique to their death penalty systems. Nonetheless, at a
minimum, state legislation should define systematic delay using the same
definition as the court in Jones. This definition encompasses delay
225. Id.
226. Brian Melley, Death Penalty Foes Ask Court to Pre-emptively Block Proposition 66
Streamlining Measure, ORANGE COUNTY REG. (Nov. 11, 2016) http://www.ocregister.com/
articles/death-735164-appeals-penalty.html.
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occurring “at each stage of the post-conviction review process, including
from the time the death sentence is issued.”227 Using that definition, state
legislation should set out sections addressing delay both at the direct
appeal and state habeas review. Addressing delay within state control will
resultantly reduce delay in federal habeas review because delay at the
direct appeal and state habeas review has a spill over effect. State
legislation should also refrain from creating time-certain deadlines for
postconviction review proceedings because at least some delay is
necessary to ensure that constitutional protections are upheld. Instead,
legislation should set timelines for appointment of counsel, filing of
briefs, and issuance of decisions, but allow courts discretion to grant time
extensions in exceptional circumstances.
A. Recommendations for Direct Appeals
The state legislation should first provide state courts of appeal
jurisdiction to review direct appeals from death penalty sentences.228 The
courts of appeal should review orders of trial courts within their district
and should issue opinions in each death penalty case.229 State supreme
courts should then have discretion to grant or deny a motion for review
of a court of appeal’s decision on a direct appeal of a death sentence.230
Providing state courts of appeal jurisdiction over direct appeals would
reduce California’s backlog of cases awaiting direct appeal to the
California Supreme Court and would reduce or prevent similar delays in
other states. Present federal law supports this proposal:
A federal death row inmate convicted in federal court of a
capital offense does not have the right to a direct appeal to
the United States Supreme Court. The Supreme Court has
jurisdiction over cases reviewed by a United States Court of
Appeals ‘[b]y writ of certiorari granted upon the petition of
any party to any civil or criminal case, before or after
rendition of judgment or decree.’ Thus, a writ of certiorari is
‘not a matter of right, but of judicial discretion.231
State legislation must also provide adequate compensation to counsel
willing to represent capital defendants on direct appeal. As California’s
death penalty systems shows, inadequate compensation of counsel can
significantly contribute to delays in appointment of appellate counsel.
Ensuring that counsel for capital defendants are adequately compensated
227. Jones v. Chappell, 31 F. Supp. 3d 1050, 1056 (C.D. Cal. 2014), rev’d sub nom., Jones
v. Davis, 806 F.3d 538 (9th Cir. 2015).
228. Alarcón, supra note 110, at 727.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Id. at 727–28.
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would accordingly help to reduce and prevent delay. In addition to raising
the hourly rate for appellate counsel, state legislation should impose
reasonable timelines for the appointment of counsel, filing of claims, and
issuance of decisions on review of direct appeals, allowing courts the
discretion to grant time extensions.
B. Recommendations for Direct Habeas Review
Like California’s Proposition, legislation should reorganize the state
habeas review cycle. State habeas petitions should be filed in the trial
court where the judgment of death was entered. Legislation should also
provide the right to appeal the denial of a state habeas petition to the state
courts of appeal. Both the trial and appellate court judges should be
required to issue written orders explaining their decisions. Going further
than California’s Proposition, the highest state court should be permitted
to exercise its discretion whether to review a state court of appeal’s
opinion affirming or denying a trial court’s judgment on a state habeas
petition.
Much like the recommendations for direct appeal, state legislation
must also provide adequate compensation to counsel willing to represent
capital defendants at the state habeas level. State legislation should
further impose timelines similar to California’s Proposition for the
appointment of counsel, filing of claims, and issuance of decisions on
state habeas petitions, while permitting courts to grant time extensions.
Unlike California, whose Proposition fails to address California’s
inadequate compensation of counsel, if counsel is adequately
compensated, implementing time constraints on the filing of petitions
should alleviate, rather than contribute to delay.
Although not contemplated under Florida’s Act nor California’s
Proposition, state legislatures should additionally explore the possibility
of establishing a jointly funded state and federal capital habeas agency.
Continuity of counsel from the state to the federal habeas level would
ensure that claims are adequately investigated and would reduce delay
attributable to the failure to exhaust available state remedies.232
C. Recommendations for Monitoring Delays and Counsel
Beyond changes to the direct appeal and state habeas review,
legislation should put in place a system to monitor capital cases and their
counsel as the cases proceed through the postconviction review process.
Similar to Florida’s Act, legislation should require courts to report the
status of any capital case that has had an appeal or petition pending for
232. Id.
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more than three years. States should use this information to further assess
and refine their legislation to ensure that it has the effect of reducing
postconviction delay. State legislation should also adopt a provision
similar to the provision in Florida’s Act prohibiting attorneys from
representing a capital defendant for five years if, on two separate
occasions, an attorney provided constitutionally deficient representation
in capital postconviction proceedings for which relief was granted.
Unlike Florida, whose Act fails to address the ABA’s finding that counsel
is under-compensated, if counsel is adequately compensated, a provision
like this should not result in a significant reduction of counsel able to
represent capital defendants. Lastly, state legislation should, like
Florida’s Act, regulate the issuance of a warrant to execute the death
sentence for any convicted capital defendant whose sentence is final
because this will ensure that warrants for executions are carried out in a
timely manner.
CONCLUSION
If states are going to continue implementing the death penalty,
systematic delay must be addressed in order to ensure its
constitutionality. This Note offers a solution to the systematic delay
recently identified in California—delay that other states may also be
experiencing. The most challenging aspect of enacting legislation to
resolve systematic delay will undoubtedly be ensuring that constitutional
protections are not lost to expediency. On one hand, delays in
postconviction review may render the death penalty arbitrary. However,
on the other, expedited postconviction review may present violations of
due process, equal protection, and the Eighth Amendment’s ban of cruel
and unusual punishment. It will be critical for legislation to strike a
balance that provides timely capital postconviction review while also
protecting these constitutional interests, particularly considering that we
live in a nation that often fails to get sentences right as the system stands
today.233

233. See ELIZABETH A. MURRAY, OVERTURNING WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS: SCIENCE
SERVING JUSTICE 92–93 (2015) (noting that according to the National Registry of Exonerations,
in 2013 there were a total of eighty-seven exonerations in the United States).
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